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CHANGING TIMES FOR THE AUDITORS
by Wallace E. Olson, President, AICPA

Any useful discussion of the auditing profession’s
effectiveness and credibility should start with an overview of

why the profession has come under such heavy attack in recent
times.

The answer lies in the perceptions of the critics and

the emerging recognition, particularly within Congress, of
the importance of the role of auditors and financial reporting.

Auditors have traditionally been looked to as a
principal means of providing a reasonable degree of assurance
as to the reliability of financial statements to help protect

investors and credit grantors from being misled by misrepresenta
tions or frauds,

More recently, however, the function has taken

on added dimensions because government officials have come to
realize:

1.

Financial statements underlie the financial
data and statistics which are used in the
formation of national policies, particularly

those relating to the economy and capital formation.

2.

Independent audits are a vital ingredient in

the scheme of control over the conduct and
accountability of the corporate entity within

our society.
It is understandable, then, that when audited financial

statements prove to have been misleading on the basis of subsequent

events, such as unheralded business failures, questions are raised
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as to how this could happen.

Assumptions are made that the auditors

failed to meet their responsibilities either as a result of deficient

performance of their work, or worse, that they knowingly placed
their imprimatur on misleading financial statements.
These perceptions stem in large part from the often
unconscious belief that an auditor’s opinion should be expected

to provide an absolute guarantee that:

1.

The financial statements are reliable without

qualification.
2.

Any material management frauds have been detected

and disclosed.

Even more extreme is the expectation that the auditor
is representing by his opinion that the judgments and actions

of management have been of high quality and in the best interests

of all who may rely on the financial statements.

Some also seem

to expect that an auditor’s opinion denotes that investment in

or extensions of credit to the company will be both safe and pro
fitable .

These exaggerated expectations contribute heavily to

the belief on the part of many critics that the profession is

failing to satisfactorily carry out its mission.

Anything less

than zero defects in financial reporting is viewed by these
individuals as being unsatisfactory.
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The profession devoutly shares the desire to reach

such a state of perfection

in an imperfect world.

But attain

ment of such an objective is not a realistic expectation.

Among

the principal reasons why this is so are:

1.

Cost/benefit considerations necessarily place
limits on the amount of audit tests that are

performed.

Thus audit tests are applied on

a sample basis rather than to 100% of all

transactions.
2.

Even if 100% of all transactions are verified
the reliability of financial statements could

not be absolutely guaranteed because they are

based upon guesses about the future such as
collectibility of receivables or the useful
lives of productive facilities.

3.

Management fraud defies detection by due

auditing care when it involves cleverly
executed collusion between related parties,
forgery or transactions which are not recorded

on the books or records.
4.

The auditing profession, like all professional

groups, cannot reasonably expect to eliminate
all breakdowns in performance or integrity

on the part of a small percentage of its members.
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Because these factors make it impossible for auditors

to provide absolute assurance as to the reliability of financial

statements the question is often asked "what good are audits if
they don’t provide complete protection?"

The answer, of course,

is that audits do provide a reasonable degree of protection and
do prevent many cases where financial statements would otherwise
be misleading.

The fact that zero defects are not achieved is

not a valid basis for concluding that the auditing function is
necessarily being performed in an unsatisfactory manner.

Even though

perfection is not attainable, the profes

sion has a responsibility to strive constantly to improve the

effectiveness of audits to the maximum extent that is reasonably

achievable.

Accordingly it is entirely appropriate to ask the

question of whether the profession is satisfactorily meeting that

responsibility.

To answer that question, the AICPA appointed a special
commission in 1974 to examine the responsibilities of auditors
in the light of legitimate expectations of the public.

Prior to

his untimely death, the Commission was chaired by Manuel Cohen,

former Chairman of the SEC.

The Commission was initially composed

of seven members, four drawn from other disciplines and interest
groups and three from the ranks of the auditing profession.
A report on its preliminary conclusions was published

on April 1, 1977.

Based upon responses and public hearings on

its tentative views the Commission has now completed its work
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and its final report will be published at the end of this month.
The report contains over 40 recommendations for improving the

way in which the profession meets its responsibilities.

The

conclusions are based in part upon an extensive body of research
into the underlying causes of the allegations directed at the
auditing profession.

Unfortunately the Commission directed only

a limited amount of its attention to the question of whether

public expectations were unreasonable and, if so, what might be
done to solve this problem.

In the meantime, while the Commission was deliberating,
the fast-moving developments within federal government circles
relating to the profession made it necessary for the profession

to respond in its own behalf to the allegations being made about
its performance.

The Metcalf subcommittee staff study of the

profession and the Moss subcommittee report on its oversight of
the SEC raised a number of fundamental questions that required

an immediate and comprehensive response if unwanted legislation
was to be avoided.

In general, it was asserted in these reports that the
performance of auditors is not as good as it should be.

The reasons

for this judgment were not clearly articulated but invariably when

such judgments are made the number of spectacular business failures
which occurred during the last decade are cited as evidence.

It does

not, of course, follow that because there were such business

failures they were necessarily accompanied by failures of auditors
to meet their responsibilities.

Nevertheless, it is clear that
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the result has been a serious erosion in the credibility of
the profession.

This loss of confidence is focused principally

on perceptions that audit failures occur because:

1.

The accounting and auditing standards being set
in the private sector are deficient in quality,

quantity and timeliness.

Therefore it is sug

gested that transfer of the setting of these

standards to a government agency should be considered.

2.

The auditors were not sufficiently independent

of their clients and either knowingly or uncon
sciously protected their clients’ interests

at the expense of third party users of financial
statements.
3.

The auditors were negligent and exercised poor

judgment in conducting their audits.

4.

The profession’s technical, independence and due
care standards are not being enforced and CPAs

and CPA firms are not being adequately punished.
Therefore the SEC should exercise its enforcement

authority more vigorously and additional forms
of governmental regulation of the profession should

be considered.
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These perceptions are so serious that the profession
can ill afford to ignore them even if they are greatly exaggerated.

I believe it is safe to say that a great majority of the profes

sion would vigorously assert that such conclusions are not
supported by the facts.

Unfortunately it is difficult to mount

objective proof that the indictment of the profession’s performance

is either warranted or unwarranted.
In any event, if those who are judging the profession
are convinced that reforms are necessary it is not terribly
effective to tell them their judgments are faulty and to engage

in what has become popularly known as ’’stonewalling".

The

distinctions between appearances and fact have become so blurred
in our society that it is almost irrelevant as to whether

appearances are distorted.

Thus the profession has taken action

to effect changes based upon the allegations of its critics even
though I am certain that a great many CPAs are unconvinced of

the validity of the necessity for such reforms.
Having briefly covered the background of the problem
of credibility facing the profession I will devote the balance

of my remarks to describing the many actions that are being taken
to bolster the confidence of the critics.

These actions are based

largely upon a composite of recommendations that emerged from
the Metcalf report and the report of the Commission on Auditors’

Responsibilities.

Many of the recommendations were put forward

by CPAs themselves in their testimony and written submissions

to Congress.

Some of the actions were already under consideration
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by the AICPA well before the recent avalanche of criticism and

recommendations.
Many of the actions, particularly those in response
to the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, will have a
significant impact on the corporations being audited and are
aimed at corporate governance.

Others are directed toward

bolstering the independence of auditors and establishing an
effective system of self-regulation of CPA firms.
For purposes of simplification I have classified the

actions under six categories:

1.

Auditing standards and peformance.

2.

Independence of auditors.

3.

Regulation of CPA firms.

4.

Discipline of individual CPAs.

5.

Management of the AICPA.

6.

Other matters.

Because of time constraints I will give only a brief
explanation of each of the items under these classifications.
I believe this will be sufficient to convince you that the pro

fession is indeed undergoing major and far-reaching changes.
I.

Auditing Standards and Performance
1.

A special committee has been appointed to study
the present structure of the AICPA’s Auditing

Standards Committee to recommend what changes
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if any should be considered in the way auditing

standards are established.

A report is expected

in the spring of 1978.

2.

Modification of the present standard auditor’s
report is under intensive study.

Under consider

ation are:

a.

A proposed standard which would eliminate
the use of ’’subject to” qualifications based

upon uncertainties and contingencies.
b.

The elimination of references to "fairly"

and "consistency".

c.

A directive by the AICPA Board of Directors

to AudSEC to develop a revised report that
will be a more effective communication device.

3.

The AICPA Board of Directors has endorsed the

concept that auditors review and publicly
report on systems of internal control of SEC companies

as separate engagements but not as a condition to
expressing audit opinions on financial statements.

It has directed AudSEC to develop standards for

such engagements.

A special advisory committee

composed principally of industry representatives
is working on the development of criteria for
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evaluating systems of internal control.

In

the meantime AudSEC has issued a standard

requiring auditors to report on internal con
trol deficiencies to boards of directors or
audit committees.

4.

The AICPA Board has endorsed the concept that
financial statements should contain a separate

footnote devoted to describing uncertainties,
It has directed the Accounting Standards Committee
to study the matter and make recommendations to

the FASB for implementing such a requirement.

Also a special committee including FEI and ABA
representatives is being appointed to develop
examples of such footnotes and to define the role
of lawyers with respect to disclosures on legal
liability uncertainties.

5.

The AICPA Board has endorsed the concept of

adoption by management of policy statements on
expected conduct and that auditors should, as

a separate engagement, review and report on
management ’s actions to assure compliance with its

policy statement.

AudSEC has been directed to

develop standards for such reviews and reports and
a special committee has been appointed to develop
a model for policy statements on conduct.

-11-

6.

The AICPA Board has endorsed

the recommendation

that a report by management be included with
financial statements indicating the responsibilities

being assumed by management.

A special committee

including industry representatives has been appointed

to develop the suggested form and content of such a

report.
7.

AudSEC has issued a standard defining more clearly
the duties and responsibilities of auditors in search
ing for and detecting fraud.

Also a standing committee

has been appointed to monitor and publish (for the
guidance of auditors) analyses of the types of frauds
and audit failures that are encountered in practice.

8.

The AICPA Board concluded that in setting accounting

standards the responsible body already takes into account
preferability among alternatives and where alternatives
are not eliminated there is the presumption that the

standards setting body found no sound basis for preference.

However, in rare cases, it is preferable, due to unusual

circumstances, to depart from GAAP to make financial
statements not misleading as provided by AICPA Rule of
Conduct 203.

The Board directed AcSEC to attempt to

develop criteria to determine when departure from GAAP

is required, due to unusual circumstances, to make
financial statements not misleading.
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9.

The AICPA Board has concluded that more attention

should be paid to the relevance of applying to
smaller or privately-owned companies, all the same

standards applied to public companies.

Also the AICPA

Council established a new senior technical committee

to set standards for accounting and review service
engagements involving unaudited financial statements.

An exposure draft on standards for unaudited financial

statements is expected to be released at the end of
this month,
II.

Independence of Auditors

1.

The AICPA Board of Directors, at the strong urging

of the SEC, has appointed a special committee to
study whether and how the AICPA could impose a re
quirement for a public company to have an audit com

mittee as a condition of expressing an audit opinion

on the company’s financial statements.

The Institute

has agreed to use its best efforts to achieve such an
objective probably through the establishment of an

auditing standard.

2.

The AICPA Board has endorsed the recommendation that

auditors be engaged, dismissed and make their fee
arrangements with the audit committee or board of

directors of their publicly-held audit clients.

Implementation of this arrangement will be studied by
the special committee on audit committees.
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3.

The AICPA Board has embraced the concept that

auditors should be required to attend the annual
shareholder’s meetings of their publicly-held
audit clients.

The special committee on audit

committees will also seek ways to implement this
requirement.
4.

The AICPA Board supports the recommendation that

the present information required in 8-K reports,
when there is a change of auditors, should be dis

closed in all audited financial statements of SEC
companies.

However it is opposed to the inclusion

of reasons for the change as currently being proposed
by the SEC.

The special committee on management

reports will seek ways to implement disclosure in
financial statements of the 8-K information.

5.

The SEC Practice Section for CPA firms has established
a requirement for its members that all disagreements

with SEC audit clients which, if not resolved, would
have resulted in a qualified opinion, be reported

in writing to the client’s audit committee or board

of directors.
6.

The SEC Practice Section for CPA firms has, among
others, adopted the following requirements for its

members:
a,

Proscribed the performance of consulting

-14engagements involving psychological testing, public

opinion polls, mergers and acquisitions for a fee
and certain aspects of marketing and plant layout.

Actuarial services and executive recruiting are cur
rently being studied to determine the extent if any

such services should be proscribed.

b.

Annual reports to the audit committee or
board of directors of SEC clients on the amount

of consulting fees and descriptions of the

types of consulting services provided during
the year.

c.

Annual reports to the section, for inclusion

in files open to the public, the per cent of

total fees represented by each of consulting,
tax and accounting and auditing services.

d.

Annual reports of the names of all SEC clients
from which the fees exceed 5% of the member’s

total fees.

e.

Mandatory rotation every five years of the audit

partner in charge of the audits of all SEC
clients.

f.

Mandatory concurring reviews of audit reports of
all SEC clients before issuance of such reports.

A concurring review is one which is conducted by
a person not otherwise involved in the audit.

-15-

III.

Regulation of CPA Firms
1.

An SEC Practice Section for membership by CPA
firms has been established within the AICPA which

imposes regulatory requirements on the member firms,
in addition to those previously mentioned, as

follows:

a.

Mandatory continuing professional education

of 40 hours a year for all professional staff

members.
b.

A mandatory peer review of the firm at least

every three years and at such other times as may

be imposed as part of a disciplinary action.
Such reviews will include investigation of

whether unreasonable time or fee pressures are
adversely effecting the quality of audits.

c.

Imposition of sanctions on firms found to be

deficient in meeting the quality control
standards of the AICPA.

d.

Annual filing of relevant information about
the firm for inclusion in files open to public
inspection. This will not, however, include
financial statements,

e.

Maintenance of minimum amounts of legal liability

insurance as prescribed by the executive committee

of the section.
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2.

The key to the success of this self-regulatory scheme for
CPA firms with SEC practice is the appointment of a

Public Oversight Board to monitor the operations

of the section and report at its discretion any
information, findings or views to the SEC, con

gressional committees or the public at large.
The Board will:

a.

Consist of five prominent individuals from
outside the profession and having unquestioned
reputations and integrity.

b.

Have access to all files, meetings and

activities of the section.

3.

c.

Have authority to hire its own staff as required.

d.

Be compensated from dues charged to member firms.

Although membership in the section is voluntary it

is believed that peer, client and public pressures

will cause membership for firms auditing SEC companies
to be mandatory for all practical purposes.
IV.

Discipline of Individual CPAs
1.

The AICPA Council has approved a requirement to
publish the names of all individual members found
guilty of charges as a result of a trial board
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Prior to such action the trial board

could elect to not publish names and has often availed
itself of this election.

2.

The AICPA Board has directed the publication of

periodic reports giving statistics on and the status

of all disciplinary actions.
3.

A special committee is studying other steps that

might be taken to open disciplinary proceedings to
the public.
V.

Management of the Institute

1.

All portions of meetings of nine AICPA senior committees
and the governing Council, when policies and technical

standards are being discussed, will be opened to the
public commencing January 1, 1978.

2.

A proposal to amend the AICPA bylaws to permit the

addition of three public representatives as members

of the Board of Directors and Council is being sub
mitted to the members for approval.

3.

Representation of Big 8 firms on all senior committees

of the AICPA has been reduced to five or less on each
committee.

4.

The AICPA Board of Directors has concurred with the
removal of its powers of appointment of the trustees

of the Financial Accounting Foundation.
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VI.

Other Matters

Modification of the Institute's rule of conduct pro
hibiting advertising and solicitation to remove virtually all
restraints except deception and false statements has been proposed

to the members.

Also modification of the rule prohibiting

incompatible occupations and repeal of a rule prohibiting the

initiation of employment of employees of other CPA firms are being

proposed.

These changes in the AICPA’s code of ethics will be

voted on by the members during the first two months of 1978.
Summary and Conclusion
I believe that you will agree that what I have just

described constitutes an impressive and massive response to nearly

all of the criticisms and recommendations that have emanated from
the two congressional subcommittees and the Commission on Auditors’

Responsibilities.

To be sure, many of the actions will require

a good deal of time to be fully implemented.

But the important

thing is that they are all in motion and have the full support of

the Institute’s governing bodies.

Parts of the program will require

the cooperation and action by other entities.

However we are

dedicated to using our best efforts to achieve the objectives that
have been adopted.
We hope that the result of all these efforts will be:
1.

Retention by the profession of the authority to
establish auditing standards.
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2.

Enhancement of the quality of work and the
independence of auditors.

3.

Better regulation not only of individual CPAs

but of CPA firms under a self-regulatory scheme.
4.

Greater participation by local practitioners in
the affairs of the profession.

5.

Establishment of a basis for drawing distinctions
between public and smaller non-public companies
for purposes of applicability of technical standards.

6.

Enhancement of the credibility and effectiveness of
the profession.

7.

Avoidance of the imposition by legislation of a federal
regulatory body for the profession.

Will we be successful in achieving these results?
one can say for certain, but I sincerely hope so.

No

If we fail, it

will not be because we did not try our best to correct our faults

as perceived by our critics.

Frankly, I know of little else that

we might do except to find a way to become godlike infallible
creatures with powers to perform miracles.

Despite all the slings and arrows I remain highly
optimistic.

Ours is a growth profession.

We have only scratched

the surface of the full potential of our role.

If we have the
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will, the imagination and the statesmanship we will continue to
earn a position of high esteem for our contribution to our freeenterprise society.

As Senator Metcalf said, "the ball is in your court”.

